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EMPLOYING RACE-NEUTRAL
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO CREATE
EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY WHILE
ATTACKING SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
DISCRIMINATION
L. DARNELL WEEDEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Diversity in American education is a positive thing for all
students from pre-kindergarten to law school and beyond. Socio-
economic status (SES) discrimination is the predominant
impediment to achieving meaningful educational diversity. The
challenge for proponents of race-neutral diversity in public
education policy is to establish effective race-neutral tools to
provide all Americans a competitive middle class education. A
"competitive middle class education" can be defined as one that
adequately equips a student upon completion of his or her
secondary education with sufficient academic skills, as reflected
in grades and test scores, to enter a respected university or
college in the state where he or she graduated from high school
without regard to race. Advocates of race-based policies to
achieve diversity in education, like advocates of race-based school
busing, should expand the debate to consider whether race-
neutral socio-economic factors might be a greater impairment to
achieving competitive educational equity for students than
continuing patterns of racial segregation. Before America
completely turns its back on education as a civil rights issue, the
Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D.,
University of Mississippi. I would like to thank my colleague Professor April Walker;
Marva 0. Coward, Public Services Coordinator Thurgood Marshall School of Law Library;
Lucinda Daniels, Director of Career Services Thurgood Marshall School of Law; and
Simeon 0. Coker, Research Assistant at Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Class of 2005,
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supporters of educational equity must 'carefully articulate the
race-neutral class-based socio-economic status (SES) issues that
prohibit students from receiving a competitive middle class
education. This debate should be treated as a race-neutral civil
rights issue that impacts all Americans for generations to come.
Gary Orfield of the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University
has suggested that the country "has turned its back on civil
rights issues, and [hasn't] had a serious debate about the
implications of it."1 Orfield opines that allowing Boston, and
other school systems, to return to neighborhood-based
frameworks is a "shameful" example of the abandonment of
education as a civil rights issue.2 On the contrary, properly
staffed and funded neighborhood schools that do not practice
racial discrimination are not inherently evil, nor do they
demonstrate an abandonment of education as a civil right.
Instead, a neighborhood school, free of racial discrimination,
which provides a student with educational equity, the so-called
"competitive middle class education," fulfils the goals of parents
who yearn for educational viability in every school.3 It is only
when public neighborhood schools are not adequately funded and
are staffed with poorly trained teachers on either a race-neutral
basis, or for that matter, a racially discriminatory one, has the
state abandoned education as a civil rights issue. When it comes
to providing educational equity to students on a race-neutral
basis, education as a civil rights issue is to be determined by wise
public policy rather than the minimal educational requirements
of the Constitution.
PART I of this article provides an introduction to the
educational equity debate from Brown v. Board of Education's
goal of integrating public schools to Grutter v. Bollinger's
objective of creating diversity in law schools. PART II analyzes
Grutter's intellectual diversity rationale. PART III discusses the
implications of race-based affirmative action's devious history.
1 Greg Toppo, Busing's Altered Route, USA TODAY, May 17, 2004, at 4D.
2 Id. (stating "[L]ike most cities, Boston uses a 'controlled choice' plan for elementary
and middle school. It reserves half of a school's space to kids from outside a neighborhood.
That has led to complaints from families who say they're locked out of local schools. Such
complaints - and tight budgets - are leading critics to say Boston and other cities should
return to neighborhood systems.")
3 Id. (noting "[Miany cities now let students choose their schools," and quoting Ted
Landsmark, chair of a city task force on racial diversity for the Boston School Committee
"The first thing that parents want is quality in all schools.")
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PART IV addresses whether race-neutral diversity percent plans
should be redefined and defended as effective methods of
accommodating class-based intellectual diversity.
While acknowledging the first anniversary of Grutter v.
Bollinger4 and celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v.
Board of Education,5 we must accept the reality that the goal of
providing all students with a competitive middle class education
remains unfulfilled. Bill Cosby, while making remarks at a May
2004 ceremony that paid tribute to the Brown v. Board of
Education decision, denounced the poor grammar used by many
underprivileged African-Americans.6 Cosby's observations
correctly suggested that African-Americans, especially those
suffering from a pattern of social and economic disadvantage, are
not likely to contribute meaningfully to intellectual diversity at
the nation's elite universities, or even in the workforce, because
they have not learned to speak basic English. 7 It is reasonable to
infer from Cosby's statement's that economically disadvantaged
African-American "knuckleheads" who cannot speak standard
English will not contribute to a diverse workforce because of
race-neutral grammar impairments rather than racial
discrimination by white employers.8 Cosby asserted that the
grammar used by blacks is a strong indication that those
individuals remain uneducated, in spite of the gains and
achievements of the civil rights movement.9 Cosby suggested that
many poorly educated blacks have squandered the opportunities
the civil rights movement provided them.O
4 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that the University of
Michigan Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further an
interest in obtaining the benefits that flow from a diverse student population is not
unlawful.)
5 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the "separate
but equal" doctrine had no place in public education and plaintiffs and others in similar
situations had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the
fourteenth amendment).
6 David Usborne, Poor Blacks Betray Rights Pioneers, Says Cosby, THE INDEPENDENT,
June 1, 2004, at 25 (quoting Cosby's statement that poor black people, or some of them,
are "knuckleheads" who mangle the English language).
7 Id.
8 See Id.
9 Cosby Has More Harsh Words About Black Community, ORLANDO SENT., July 2,
2004, at A6 (noting Cosby told a room of activists that too many black men are beating
their wives while their children run around not knowing how to read or write).
10 Id. (acknowledging Cosby's statement accusing blacks of squandering the
opportunities the civil rights movement gave them).
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In a subsequent July 2004 speech at the Rainbow/PUSH
Coalition & Citizenship Education Fund annual meeting, Cosby
reiterated his concern that some in the black community,
especially the youth, are not taking advantage of the gains of the
civil rights movement; they think they are hip, "but they can't
read; they can't write. They're laughing and giggling, and they're
going nowhere."" Cosby suggested that inadequately educated
black children who use poor grammar were the black
community's "dirty laundry" that many of his detractors would
rather not discuss outside the confines of the African-American
community.12 In a larger context, Cosby's comments highlighted
the sensitive reality that all individuals in America who are true
victims of economic discrimination are not likely to contribute to
meaningful diversity at America's elite universities without an
effective race-neutral SES affirmative action plan.
It is this Author's contention that the educational achievement
gap between a competitive middle class education and the
inferior education that others receive is America's "dirty laundry"
of class division. In response to Cosby's comments, Theodore
Shaw, Director-Counsel and President of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, wrote about America's class
divide in a recent editorial.13 "Unlike much of the world," he
wrote, "we ignore human rights protections against
discrimination based on economic status.1 4 As a nation, we wage
war on poor people in this country and not on poverty."15 Shaw
argued that the dysfunctional educational experiences in the
black community stem from the large concentration of poverty in
that community. 16 If the United States Supreme Court was more
realistic about the harsh impact that socio-economic status has
on a child's chance to receive an equitable competitive middle
11 Joseph Perkins, Bill Cosby's Comments Have U.S. Audience Riveted, THE OAKLAND
TRIB., July 11, 2004.
12 Cosby Has More Harsh Words About Black Community, ORLANDO SENT., July 2,
2004, at A6 (quoting Cosby's admonishment that others were trying to hide the black
community's "dirty laundry").
13 Theodore Shaw, Beyond What Cosby Said, WASH POST, May 27, 2004 at A31.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. (stating violence and dysfunction in poor black communities are under an
especially glaring spotlight, but arguing many of the problems Cosby addressed are
largely a function of concentrated poverty in black communities - the legacy of centuries of
governmental and private neglect and discrimination).
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class education, the Court might have come to a different
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.17 In Rodriguez, the Court essentially approved
district-by-district wealth discrimination in expenditures for
public education by sustaining the constitutionality of a property
tax-based system in Texas, allowing school districts to maintain
wide gaps in expenditures for the education of Texas children.18
Shaw correctly suggested that a dysfunctional educational
experience for all students is often the result of poorly funded
schools.19 The over-arching message of Rodriguez's property tax-
based school funding system is that the state may deny poor
children and others living in property-poor school districts an
equitable chance at a competitive middle class education.20 Poor
children and their parents in search of a competitive middle class
education should find very little comfort in the Supreme Court's
minimalist approach toward a state's constitutional duty to
educate its children. 21 Under this approach, as suggested in
Plyler v. Doe,2 2 a state may rationally deny equitable access to
education to the poor children as a class.23 A state is not allowed
to totally deny poor children an education, but it is not required
to provide them with an equitable one.24
Although Brown advanced the American agenda as a
multiracial society of equals, the educational achievement gains
17 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
18 Id. at 18.
19 Shaw, supra note 13 (arguing "[P]redictably, conservatives are applauding Bill
Cosby for saying that the problems of the black community stem primarily from personal
failures and moral shortcomings. But just as we in the progressive African-American
community cannot countenance the demonization of poor people, we must not cede the
issue of personal responsibility to ideological conservatives. Most poor black people
struggle admirably to raise their children well. Parents, including single mothers, work
for low wages, sometimes in multiple jobs, to support their families. Recently Cosby
recognized this in a press statement in which he emphasized that he was not criticizing
everyone in the 'black lower economic classes' but intended to issue a 'call to action' and to
foster" 'a sense of shared responsibility and action."')
20 Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 18-20 (holding education is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our federal Constitution).
21 See Id. (limiting state's constitutional obligation to ensure equality of education to
its citizens).
22 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding a Texas law denying education to the children of
unlawful foreigners unconstitutional.).
23 Id.
24 See Id.
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resulting from Brown can best be described as very modest. 25 The
educational achievement gap between blacks and whites remain
significant because a disproportionate number of blacks suffer
from socio-economic status inferiority. Historically speaking,
Brown simply failed to reasonably foresee class-based economic
inferiority as a barrier to educational achievement on par with
racial segregation. When America makes a total commitment to
provide all of its children with a comparable middle class
education it will need neither race-based nor class-based
affirmative action in education. One editorial writer complained,
"equal access to public schools has not produced equal
education."26 Since society continues to ignore socio-economic
factors that prevent the educational achievement gap between
advantaged and disadvantaged groups from closing, Brown's
removal of de jure racial segregation as impairment to a quality
education for all students remains an incomplete remedy. Brown
simply did not address the issue of economic discrimination as an
impairment to equal results in educational performance of
students. Because "vast gaps still separate the academic
achievement of black and white students,"27 it is absolutely
necessary and proper to "shift the national conversation away
from... integration to new education strategies that deliver
more equal education results" 28 in an environment with zero
tolerance for racial discrimination. Black columnist Leonard
Pitts Jr. stated that fifty years after the Brown decision, "I'm
more concerned about the fact that black kids read poorly, are
not proficient in math and go to college less often than I'm
concerned with the fact that they don't get to sit next to white
kids in the process".29 Pitts concedes that the shift of focus from
school integration to the quality of public education that African-
American children are actually receiving saddens him because
integration is an important expression of American equality
25 Patrick Welsh, Perfect - And Hard to Reach, WASH POST, May 2, 2004 at B01
(observing that fifty years after the Brown decision, we are still worrying about equal
access to quality education).
26 Equal Access to Schools Fails to Equalize Education, USA TODAY, Apr. 29, 2004, at
All (stating educational gains from Brown decision were smaller than educational gains
of subsequent Brown-inspired decisions) [hereinafter Equal Access].
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Leonard Pitts Jr., 50 Years of Black, White and Brown - Are We There Yet?, HOUS.
CHRON., May 17, 2004, at 2.
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"where children of all colors, cultures and creeds are taught
together."30 Notably, the Brown decision has always been about
issues far broader than simply the physical integration of public
schools. Brown integrated African-Americans into the United
States' Constitution as legal equals before the law without
having to continue to wear the constitutional badge of inferiority
given to them in Plessy v. Ferguson.31 It is encouraging that
commentators like Pitts are ready to accept that America has a
duty to educate all of her children regardless of the racial make-
up of the classroom.
African-Americans should properly view Brown as an
important first step for economic justice through educational
equity if only because ending racial segregation in schools gave
many African-Americans their first opportunity to acquire the
competitive middle class education needed for career
advancement. Although school integration (or, perhaps more
fittingly, desegregation) remains a desirable goal as a means to
close the educational gaps between the economically
disadvantaged and economically advantaged, the African-
American community has the level of intellectual maturity to
realize that race is not the only factor involved in providing a
student with a competitive middle class education. The African-
American quest for economic justice through the medium of equal
educational opportunity has not been realized because
"researchers now realize that factors such as birth weight, how
much parents read to their children, the amount of TELEVISION
kids watch and teacher expectations influence educational
achievement more than integrated classrooms."32
Those of us who grew up poor know that groups who have
suffered from the adverse impact of lack of economic justice are
more likely to produce children in the "at-risk" educational
achievement group. I know from personal experience of
childhood poverty that parents with competent reading skills
who are the victims of adverse economic discrimination are so
busy trying to "make a living" or survive from "paycheck-to-
30 Id.
31 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (holding that a law authorizing
the separation of the races in public conveyances is not unreasonable or offensive to the
Fourteenth Amendment).
32 See Equal Access, supra note 26, at All.
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paycheck" that they are not likely to have adequate time to read
to their children. As a poor child in the Mississippi delta,
television provided me with a reliable medium of entertainment
and communication, but the messages I received failed to inform
me that the excessive watching of television could possibly
undermine my opportunity for future educational achievement
and professional advancement. My under-funded elementary
school was attended by African-Americans only. I clearly
understood from the first grade to the fifth grade that my
teachers did not expect very much from African-American
students whose parents were not schoolteachers. However, I
developed a positive attitude towards learning in the sixth grade
because I knew my teacher, Mr. Willis, expected me to perform at
a very high academic level in spite of the fact that neither of my
parents were schoolteachers. My life experiences in the
Mississippi delta are consistent with the reality of most low
income African-American families that a student's socio-economic
status and the quality of the school a student attends impacts the
educational achievement of an individual African-American
student more than the racialmakeup of his or her classroom.33
An article by David L. Chappell, appearing in the New York
Times on May 8, 2004, entitled If Affirmative Action
Fails... What Then?,34 stated that, "many people earnestly
believe that aggressive remedies like affirmative action are still
necessary to eliminate the inequality at which Brown made only
a glancing blow."35 Because America is a nation where symbols
are very important, it is unfair to characterize the symbolic value
of Brown as giving racial inequality a temporary setback. 36 It is
important not to forget that in 1954, Brown rejected state-
sponsored racial inequality that was approved fifty-eight years
33 Id. (discussing black high school graduates who, on average, have skills of an
eighth grade white student, have higher failure rates on state exams, and take fewer
accelerated classes than white students).
34 David L. Chappell, If Affirmative Action Fails... What Then?, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
2004, at B7.
35 Id.
36 Richard Thompson Ford, Symposium: Brown at Fifty, Brown's Ghost, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1305, 1305 (2004) (stating Brown made racism and discrimination unacceptable and
established different expectations regarding race and integration).
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earlier by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson,37 in effect,
changing the inequality playing field.
Brown's holding that state-sponsored "separate but unequal"
public education based on intentional racial discrimination was
an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause gave
voice to millions of Americans of color and their supporters. 38
Brown's attack on racial inequality in education created a new
dialogue about developing effective means of protecting the self-
respect of all Americans while providing people of color with a
new opportunity to achieve economic justice.39 *
Race-neutral affirmative action is defined as a process by
which individuals are presumed to have suffered from
discrimination by society because of their SES. Race-neutral
affirmative action does not consider race as a factor, and it is not
designed to be a substitute for considering race as a factor.
Rather, it considers the total SES of an individual when deciding
to offer her a race-neutral affirmative action package.
Aggressive, race-neutral affirmative action steps should be taken
by society to insure that all students, regardless of their socio-
economic status, are given a reasonable opportunity to obtain a
competitive middle class education. A student with a competitive
middle class education is presumed to be qualified to perform
college level work at public universities in his or her state.
However, the evidence clearly demonstrates that for the average
African-American student, such an education has not been
37 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (accepting the "separate but equal" doctrine as constitutionally
sound).
38 [Tjhe Brown decision was the catalytic event which gave impetus to the civil
rights movement which followed. In other words, Brown had a mushrooming effect or
a spillover effect as it opened the floodgates to sit-ins, marches, freedom rides and
other forms of protests. Brown also started a chain reaction and engendered a
proliferation of litigation housing and minority enterprise. Brown led to executive
orders by presidents and legislative enactments by Congress (e.g. Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act) and other legislative bodies to address discrimination. And
Brown eventually led to the enlargement of the doors of opportunity for all minorities.
Williams: Brown Paved Way For Me, WASH POST, May 13, 2004 at T05.
39 [T]hough desegregation and integration has not been as smooth and effective as
originally envisioned by the Brown court and those supporting the decision and its
remedy, Brown became the focal point behind the movement for the guarantee that
every child be given adequate and equal resources in order for him or her to have an
opportunity to reach their full potential.
Id.
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attained.40 "On average, black students who graduate from high
school are equipped with the skills the average white student
mastered by the eighth grade, according to federal tests."41 It is
obvious that black students who graduate from high school with
eighth grade skills are not prepared to attend any accredited
college, elite or not. Black students with eighth grade skills
cannot be expected to contribute meaningful academic diversity
at any accredited college in a positive manner. A race-neutral
affirmative action plan applies to all students qualified to attend
a college or professional school. It would only apply to those
individuals qualified to meet the academic requirement of the
college to which they apply. Qualified college applicants whose
applications enter the SES diversity applicant pool may be given
a preference over other individuals with higher standardized test
scores and higher grade point averages to support a school's
interest in promoting socio-economic status diversity. Under the
SES race-neutral affirmative action plan, qualified African-
Americans, other minorities, whites, and all other qualified
individuals will compete with each other for a SES preference
slot in the admission process.
Because of America's historic failure to adequately fund and
develop the four race-neutral factors of teacher quality, high
quality preschool, school accountability, and competition that
help "boost classroom learning"42 many have erroneously come to
believe that race-based affirmative action or integrated
classrooms are the only effective means of achieving educational
equality for African-Americans. Research suggests the education
achievement gap for all students could be significantly improved
and eliminated by addressing issues relevant to teacher
quality,43 high quality preschools,44 school accountability45 and
40 Stephan Thernstrom, Another Bend In 'The Shape Of the River, WASH POST, Dec.
14, 1998 at A23 (noting the grades of the average black student put him or her at the 23rd
percentile of the class).
41 See Equal Access, supra note 26, at All.
42 Id.
43 Parents in suburban schools accustomed to strong teachers have a hard time
imagining the low quality of teaching in poor districts. In schools serving affluent
families, 70% of the students have teachers who majored in the subject they instruct
and hold a teaching license in the topic. In schools where most kids are poor, that
holds true for only half the students. Drawing on multiple studies, the non-profit
Education Trust calculates that if students were assigned highly rated teachers for
five years, test-score gaps separating poor and middle-class students would
disappear.
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competition. 46 A realistic commitment by the American people to
excellent teacher quality at all schools, high-quality preschools
for all students, regardless of their race or socio-economic status,
coupled with holding schools accountable for the academic
performance of all students, including minority students, and
allowing providers of education to compete for students, will
make the need for race-based affirmative action unnecessary.
It seems all too obvious that if students came to college
prepared with a competitive middle class education and free of
psychological burdens of racial inferiority, schools would not have
to base admission on a race-based or race-neutral affirmative
action plan. 47 The quality of primary and secondary education
within a state can vary dramatically, according to one
commentator. 48 Those who support diversity in education would
be well-served to heed the advice of Constance Hawke, a lawyer
from Cleveland, Ohio, to develop affirmative action alternatives
that do not include race as a factor, a "suspect" legal factor that
produces much of the attack on affirmative action.49 Although I
Id.
44 High-quality preschools. When black students arrive in kindergarten, only 20%
have the skills needed to learn to read, compared with 50% of their classmates,
according to the U.S. Education Department. Only high-quality preschools that focus
on learning skills have proved capable of closing that gap. Children attending
Chicago's Child-Parent Centers, for example, enjoy lifelong academic and social gains,
long-running research shows. The key to their success is college-educated teachers
who focus on pre-reading skills.
Id.
45 For years, no one asked how minority groups performed, as long as a school's
average test scores were acceptable. All too often, though, they lagged other groups of
students. Requiring schools to highlight minority students' test scores holds them
responsible for ensuring that all students learn at higher levels. That's one goal of the
federal accountability law, No Child Left Behind. But a revolt by states risks leading
to watered-down reporting requirements that could dampen the effectiveness of
performance standards for improving minority achievement.
Id.
46 Schools in the experimental Knowledge is Power Program offer better education
for 4,000 urban students, and serve as laboratories that more schools could imitate.
Other competition options include allowing students in failing schools to transfer to
adjoining school districts, and giving students vouchers to attend private schools
when public schools are failing.
Id.
47 See Constance Hawke, Refraining The Rationale For Affirmative Action In Higher
Education Admissions, 135 ED. LAW REP. 1, 18 (1999) (discussing the impact K-12
schooling has on student preparedness for higher education).
48 See Id. at 18 (emphasizing primary and secondary educational standards can vary
widely within states).
49 [One] alternative would be to maintain affirmative action practices but to change
the basis for preferential treatment to categories that are not "suspect" in nature. The
reason that the current practice of affirmative action is under legal attack is that it
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concede that Grutter does not require race-neutral affirmative
action plans, I share Hawke's belief that universities can develop
effective race-neutral preferences to increase intellectual
diversity. 50 Since primary and secondary education paves the
road to college, college and university administrators and faculty
must lobby for high quality "and funding for K-12 in order to
ensure that higher education standards will not have to be
lowered to accommodate under-prepared students or to spend
higher education resources, not on new knowledge, but on
remedial information and skills that should have been acquired
early in the education process."51 Students "who attend inner
city schools that are inadequately funded may not be prepared to
enter higher education without extraordinary concessions by the
university." 52 It is asserted that an "individual who is unable to
compete in the university environment ... will drop out [and
perpetuate] the downward spiral."53 Inadequately funded schools
are not limited to inner cities. Inadequately funded schools exist
in rural America and throughout America. It may be argued that
any student, regardless of race, who attends an inadequately
funded school coupled with a personally inferior SES is at
significant risk of not succeeding at the college level.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF GRUTTER 'S INTELLECTUAL DIVERSITY RATIONALE
David L. Chappell observed that enthusiastic advocates of
race-based affirmative action are irritated because race-based
affirmative action has had "very limited success in closing the
academic and economic gaps between black and white
Americans." 54 The Supreme Court held in Grutter v. Bollinger
that race could be a factor in making an admission decision to
permits preferences on the basis of race or national origin-and those preferences are
prohibited by Title VI, Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment. Preferential
treatment is entirely legal if it is granted for other reasons; in fact, many colleges and
universities routinely show preferential treatment in admissions for legacies (when
an applicant's family previously attended the institution) and other special skills
(such as athletic or musical abilities).
Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See Chappell, supra note 34, at B7 (explaining the discontent among affirmative
action supporters regarding the program's effectiveness).
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promote intellectual diversity at the University of Michigan Law
School. 55 The Court's intellectual diversity justification in
support of the use of race as a factor in a public law school's
affirmative action plan, however, is flawed. Using the
intellectual diversity rationale is not compelling enough to justify
the limited use of race to support the educational interest of elite
colleges because there is no plausible rational connection
between race and intellectual mixture.56 Furthermore, the elite
colleges' intellectual diversity justification is not compelling
because it is tailored to serve "Michigan's interest in maintaining
a 'prestige' law school" 57 without adequately addressing the issue
of "providing access to higher education for large numbers of
minorities." 58 In reality, a very modest number of minorities are
impacted by race-based affirmative action at elite colleges.5 9
Unfortunately, the Court allowed the University of Michigan, a
flagship public law school, to use race as a compelling factor to
justify intellectual diversity without really considering that there
may exist race-neutral approaches which would expand
55 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause
does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to
further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body.").
56 The list of amici curiae urging the Court to uphold racial and ethnic preference
policies was extraordinary. I cannot think of a case in which so many leading figures
in the worlds of education, business, and even the military have united to protect a
policy under constitutional review. The Establishment left the Justices in no doubt as
to where the mainstream of elite opinion stood on the matter. Yet neither the amici
nor the Justices who accepted the position they urged could manage to identify
grounds on which racial and ethnic diversity can plausibly be said to constitute a
compelling interest as a matter of constitutional law. Given that Michigan does not
have anything that would qualify as a "compelling" state interest in establishing or
maintaining an elite law school in the first place, how could it have a "compelling"
state interest in racial and ethnic diversity at that law school? Justice Scalia,
dissenting in the denial of relief to Barbara Grutter, cut to the heart of the matter:
[Tihe allegedly "compelling state interest" at issue here is not the incremental
"educational benefit" that emanates from the fabled "critical mass" of minority
students, but rather Michigan's interest in maintaining a "prestige" law school whose
normal admissions standards disproportionately exclude blacks and other minorities.
If that is a compelling state interest, everything is.
See Robert P. George, Symposium, On Grutter and Gratz: Examining "Diversity" in
Education: "Gratz and Grutter: Some Hard Questions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1634, 1635-36
(2003).
57 Id. at 1636.
58 Hawke, supra note 47, at 16.
59 See Id. at 16 (noting that only about twenty to thirty percent of four-year colleges
and universities are in position to take account of race in admissions decisions; vast
majority do not award any special status to applicants on basis of race).
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intellectual diversity. 60 A recent study conducted by Princeton
University researchers has concluded that a Texas plan which
allows a student in the top ten percent of a high school
graduating class to qualify for admission to any public university
or college in the state has increased racial and intellectual
diversity at the state's elite universities. 61 The race-neutral "Top
10 Percent Plan helps students who might not otherwise have a
chance to go to one of the state's prestigious public
universities." 62 Law schools and graduate schools must follow the
lead of Texas in creating appropriate and flexible race-neutral
plans to increase educational diversity for the SES-
disadvantaged student. Race-neutral admissions plans at the
graduate or professional school level should go beyond race-
neutral percent plans in addressing their respective institutional
need to expand academic diversity.
Former college athletes who meet minimum qualifications for
admissions to graduate and professional schools are a
tremendous source of potential intellectual diversity for both elite
graduate schools and elite law schools. College athletes are often
from diverse SES backgrounds and must engage in a cross-
cultural and multiracial understanding of their sport in order to
be a successful and well-respected team player. The Grutter
intellectual diversity rationale allows an elite university to give
preferences to minimally-qualified athletes who decide to attend
law school after their collegiate athletic career has ended. 63 A
law school or graduate school may define what factors constitute
multicultural athletic status for purpose of achieving its
academic diversity, but under no circumstances should a law
school or graduate school consider race as a factor in deciding
whether a former athlete deserves to be admitted under its
multicultural educational diversity preference plan. The law
school or graduate school admissions team should articulate
those factors it considers in determining whether a former
60 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (finding that law school adequately considered race-
neutral alternatives).
61 Darren Meritz, Top 10% Plan Has Improved Diversity at Top Texas Collexes. EL
PASO TIMES. Jan. 23. 2004. at Al (noting that Texas' flagship universities are maintaining
enrollment of top students from highly competitive feeder high schools).
62 Id.
63 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (referring to fact that universities make individualized
assessments necessary to assemble student body that is not just racially diverse, but
diverse along all qualities valued by university).
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athlete qualifies for a multicultural diversity admission. At a
minimum, former athletes seeking a multicultural diversity
admission preference must demonstrate that are qualified based
on grades and test scores and have the potential for expanding
the multiracial nature of intellectual dialogue in a classroom
setting, or otherwise have a positive potential for bringing
intellectual diversity to the learning enterprise.
Former athletes at universities are likely to bring a different
set of multicultural views and experiences to either a law school
or a graduate school than others. One must remember that
America's colleges and universities recruit athletes based on
merit rather than race at the undergraduate level. Such a
diversity plan is not a pretext for using race as a factor in the
admission process at graduate or law school level; it is a
pragmatic recognition that successful role model collegiate and
professional sports figures must possess both a cross-racial and a
cross-cultural understanding of our society. In the Bakke
opinion, Justice Powell quoted a President of Princeton
University for the proposition that informal learning through
diversity can come from the presence of basketball players on a
college campus. 64 An elite law school could reserve ten admission
slots each year for those elite athletes with a B average in
undergraduate studies that demonstrate strong leadership skills
and the ability to articulate an intellectual vision for
multicultural diversity that will better American society. Under
its race-neutral intellectual diversity admission plan for true
scholar athletes with an appropriate grade point average, the
64 [A] great deal of learning occurs informally. It occurs through interactions among
students of both sexes; of different races, religion, and backgrounds: who come from
cities and rural areas, from various states and counties; who have a wide variety of
interests, talents, and perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn
from their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine even their most
deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world. As a wise graduate of
ours observed in commenting on this aspect of the educational process, 'People do not
learn very much when they are surrounded only by the likes of themselves.' In the
nature of things, it is hard to know how, and when, and even if, this informal
'learning through diversity' actually occurs. It does not occur for everyone. For many,
however, the unplanned, casual encounters with roommates, fellow suffers in an
organic chemistry class, student workers in the library, teammates on a basketball
squad, or other participants in class affairs or student government can be so subtle
and yet powerful sources of improved understanding and personal growth.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 n. 48 (1978) (Powell, J.)
(quoting William G, Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI
WKLY., Sep. 26, 1977, at 7, 9).
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elite law school may give the LSAT a very modest value in
weighing the factors for admitting the elite athletes. This "elite
athletes at elite colleges intellectual diversity proposal" should be
viewed as a helpful race-neutral affirmative action plan to
encourage elite athletes that are good students, possessing life
experiences that create intellectually diverse classrooms, to
attend law school or graduate school. It also serves the same
positive public policy goals as the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan,
that of encouraging good students to attend college, law school, or
graduate school.65 While speaking positively about the Texas
plan, Maggie Smith, Dean of the University College at the
University of Texas at El Paso said, "I think that any program
that encourages students to go to college is a good thing."66
Under Grutter's intellectual diversity rationale, 67 could
the Supreme Court approve a race-based affirmative action plan
that purports to use race as one of the many positive factors to be
considered in evaluating the application of a poor white
candidate because poor whites are likely to bring a unique view
to an elite law school? Could a poor white applicant for
admission to law school make a compelling equal protection
argument that the law school's admission committee should give
his socio-economic status the same weight as race for a minority
applicant because he spent most of his childhood living in a
trailer park in Detroit on Eight Mile Road?68 The white applicant
65 See Meritz, supra note 61. at Al (suggesting that the Top 10 Percent Plan is
positive effort that is encouraging good students to attend college).
66 Id.
67 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (asserting that admissions programs must be flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity, and place them on same footing for
consideration, but not necessarily according them same weight).
68 The [current] debate over the merits of affirmative action essentially boils down
to questions of fairness for both black and white applicants. Critics say it results in
'reverse discrimination' against white applicants who are passed over in favor of less
well-qualified black students, some of whom suffer when they attend schools they're
not prepared for. But Gary Orfield, director of Harvard University's Civil Rights
Project, argues that emphasizing diversity has not meant admitting unqualified
students.
Opponents also say that with the expansion of the black middle class in the past 20
years, these 'programs should be refocused on kids from low-income homes. 'It just
doesn't make sense to give preference to the children of a wealthy black businessman,
but not to the child of a Vietnamese boat person or an Arab-American who is
suffering discrimination,' says Curt Levey, director of legal affairs at the Center for
Individual Rights.
See Barbara Kantrowitz, What's At Stake; In the Competitive World of College
Admissions, 'Fairness'Is Often In The Eye of The Beholder, Here Are The Facts About
Affirmative Action, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 2003, at 30.
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could argue that a poor white that grew up in a trailer park,
rapping with a group of African-Americans will bring a diverse
viewpoint to the issue of social and economic justice. Under
Grutter's framework, where an African-American and a white
student growing up in a trailer park in Eight Mile possess
identical credentials, the white candidate may not get the last
available seat because he is white so long as the law school is free
to use race as a positive plus factor to admit the black student
under its mantra of seeking academic diversity. The poor white
applicant from Detroit's Eight Mile hypothetical reminds us that
whenever government uses race as a basis for granting a benefit
or placing a burden on an individual, the government travels
down a slippery slope of creating racial division among
Americans because of the race-based policy's unintended impact
or evil intent.
Further, the Grutter race-based intellectual diversity rationale
lacks legitimacy because race-neutral diversity plans like the
Texas Top Ten Percent plan demonstrate that there is no
"pressing public necessity" to discriminate against whites in
undergraduate college admissions based on race to achieve
diversity. 69 The intellectual diversity rationale is just a pretext
for a soft racial quota 70 Professor George correctly asserts that in
a university setting, where the exchange of intellectual ideas is
placed at a premium, "few people who shape university policy
notice, much less care about, the absence of diversity" in
intellectual discussions. 71 Because university policymakers prior
to Grutter did not engage in any serious discussion about the
69 A majority of the Court has validated only two circumstances where 'pressing
public necessity' or a 'compelling state interest' can possibly justify racial discrimination
by state actors. First, the lesson of Korematsu is that national security constitutes a
'pressing public necessity,' though the government's use of race to advance that objective
must be narrowly tailored. Second, the Court has recognized as a compelling state
interest a government's effort to remedy past discrimination for which it is responsible.
(see Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989)).Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349-51
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299
(opinion of Powell, J.)) (explaining "This standard of 'pressing public necessity' has more
frequently been termed 'compelling governmental interest."').
70 See George, supra note 56, at 1639 (examining one pool of applicants to University
of Michigan in 1999, where eighty-one percent of African-American applicants were
accepted, compared to three percent of Caucasian applicants, in order to demonstrate
existence of soft racial quota).
71 Id. at 1636 (surmising that because majority of university policymakers do not care
about absence of faculty diversity in political and religious viewpoints, claimed desire for
intellectual benefits does not really motivate defense of existing preference systems).
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benefits of intellectual diversity, Professor George appropriately
rejects the claim that the intellectual benefits of diversity is the
true motive behind race-based admissions programs. 72 Many
individuals would object to a poor white student from Detroit's
Eight Mile Road receiving any intellectual diversity preference
consideration because of his race, and would agree that the
intellectual diversity theory is actually a poorly disguised act of
racial discrimination. 73 Justice Thomas, dissenting in Grutter,
accused the Court of engaging in racial balancing to allow the
law school to create a "critical mass of underrepresented"
minority multicultural diversity students" in its student body. 74
Professor Flagg's Diversity Discourses essay is an earnest but
inconsistent effort to justify race-conscious academic diversity as
a means of promoting a variety of intellectual viewpoints. 75
Professor Flagg's essay contends that race should be considered
as a positive life experience factor when considering the
application of an African-American because his or her race will
probably promote an intellectually heterogeneous student body.76
In fact, it is intellectual folly to proclaim that race for an African-
American is a predominant indicator of the potential for
intellectual diversity at a university while asserting at same time
that "race-conscious diversity-oriented programs do not
72 Id. at 1636-37 (suggesting that university's claimed motive is less than compelling
when analyzed in comparison to non-diverse faculty, and that real motive behind racially
driven admissions program is to maintain law school's reputation as elite institution).
73 See id. at 1639 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 853 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (holding that achieving racial diversity in student body is not compelling state
interest), rev'd in part and vacated in part by 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 539 U.S.
306 (2003)).
74 Undoubtedly there are other ways to "better" the education of law students aside
from ensuring that the student body contains a "critical mass" of underrepresented
minority students. Attaining "diversity", whatever it means, is the mechanism by
which the Law School obtains educational benefits, not an end of itself. The Law
School, however, apparently believes that only a racially mixed student body can lead
to the educational benefits it seeks. How, then, is the Law School's interest in these
allegedly unique educational "benefits" not simply the forbidden interest in "racial
balancing" that the majority expressly rejects?
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354-55 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
75 See Barbara J. Flagg, Essay Diversity Discourses, 78 TUL. L. REV. 827, 833-37
(2004) (rationalizing that diversity discourse in admission procedures is beneficial as
compared to affirmative action because it both achieves desired heterogeneous student
body and is less concerned with racial differences and benefits to particular minority
groups).
76 Id. at 834 (explaining that race adds to intellectual diversity of student body
because it is another unique element within mix of different backgrounds and experiences
that each student possesses and puts forth in classroom setting).
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presuppose a belief that there is any correlation between a given
racial identity and a particular perspective." 77
Granted, there is no single black experience. 78 The lack of a
single black experience suggests that general stereotypical
notions about the "black experience" as a group to support
intellectual diversity is not consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause's goal of protecting individuals regardless of their race. 79
This race-based intellectual diversity argument is simply a form
of reverse racial discrimination that is shifting race- based harms
from historically-innocent African-Americans to specific
currently-innocent whiteS0 individuals because of their racial
status. While views may differ, one commentator has defined the
term 'innocent whites' as those individuals who believe in their
innocence because they are "not guilty of a racist act that has
denied the minority applicant the job or other position she
seeks."81 It is both appropriate and necessary for advocates of
race-based affirmative action policies to at least acknowledge
that race-based intellectual diversity programs may be the cause
in fact, but not the legal cause, of the harm suffered by innocent
whites. Notably, the term 'innocent whites' is used in the context
of the Grutter intellectual diversity debate to refer to those white
applicants competing for college slots who are not legally liable
for any racial discrimination against any individual receiving a
race-based college admission preference.8 2 Even if one concedes
that the law school's selection process in Grutter is holistic and
individualized, it is still a constitutionally defective process that
hurts whites because they (unlike racial minorities) do not
77 Id. at 834-35 (proposing that race should be considered in same light with other
experiences and characteristics that constitute our unique identities).
78 Id. at 835 (stating that distinct lives and experiences of each African-American
leads to different viewpoints and perspectives that would contribute to intellectual
diversity of university).
79 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that all
racial classifications are subject to strict judicial scrutiny and further indicating that
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect people rather than groups).
80 See Flagg, supra note 75, at 829. ("[P]ublic debate about affirmative action is
steeped in the rhetoric of innocence; the costs to whites imposed by affirmative action
measures are costs borne by 'innocent white victims."' (citing Thomas Ross, Innocence and
Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 300-01 (1990))).
78 Id.
82 Id.
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individually receive any benefit of race as a positive plus factor at
any point in the admission process.8 3
It is incontrovertible that innocent whites suffer in the battle
for admission slots at elite schools because the Supreme Court in
Grutter revived the intellectual ghost of Plessy by holding that a
state may treat students unequally under the law because of
their group racial status.8 4 Plessy and Grutter are related in their
sanctioning of state discrimination against an individual on the
basis of race. Because I would have opposed the Supreme Court's
use of race in Plessy in 1896,85 I must object to the Grutter
Court's approval of a race-based intellectual diversity rationale
in 2004. Unlike some commentators,8 6 my belief is that one who
lacks legal blameworthiness for acts of racial discrimination
should not be legally required to individually bear the burden of
reverse racial discrimination in the name of race-based
intellectual diversity.
Grutter's race-based intellectual diversity does not exist
without cost. 87 Professor Flagg asserts, from an institutional
perspective, that when race-based intellectual diversity benefits
the entire university, there are no innocent white victims. 88 An
institutional perspective should not countenance white
discrimination in the name of a suspect race-based intellectual
diversity policy. In fact, there is no substantial evidence that
racial discrimination in favor of African-Americans will present
an intellectual view in the classroom or elite university setting
that is different in kind or substance from their white
counterparts. "In the context of academic diversity, race is not a
proxy for a point of view." 89
If race is not the predominant marker for life experience, then
a white student from Detroit's Eight Mile Road with a life
83 Contra, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
84 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343-44 (holding that use of racial preferences is still
necessary to further intellectual diversity interests).
85 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 550-51 (holding that law allowing separation of
races in public transportation is not unreasonable or offensive to Fourteenth
Amendment).
86 See Flagg, supra note 75, at 829 (discussing that lack of individual
blameworthiness is rationale behind finding whites to be "innocent victims").
87 Contra Id. at 835 (suggesting that benefits of racial diversity are so great that
there is no cost to whites in the practice of affirmative action).
88 Id. (arguing that because affirmative action creates no costs to whites, there are,
subsequently, no white victims).
89 Id. at 846.
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experience similar to the experience of his African-American
counterpart should be given an intellectual diversity preference
similar to the one granted to African-Americans. If intellectual
diversity is truly to be determined by the contents of one's
viewpoint, and not the color of his skin, then the hypothetical
white student from Detroit"s Eight Mile Road is just as entitled
to an intellectual diversity preference under Grutter's90 rationale.
Professor Flagg has concluded that race-based "affirmative action
is seen by whites as problematic just because the 'other' is
receiving something 'we' are not."91
Race-based affirmative action is problematic for many whites
because whites are people too and do not wish to see anyone
given an academic racial preference admission under an illusory
intellectual diversity concept. Clearly, race-based affirmative
action, as well as race-based academic diversity, are losing
ground in the court of public opinion not simply because of their
"costs to whites."92 Race-based laws should rightfully lose ground
in the court of public opinion because they bankrupt the
constitutional principle of equal protection of the laws, while
reinvesting in the Plessy tradition of allowing the state to treat
people differently, and to their disadvantage, because of the
racial identity assigned to them by the government. When
members of the human race are born in America, the government
will typically assign them a racial classification of white, black or
place them in another racial category it deems relevant. The
only way to truly bury Plessy is to adopt the recommendation 93
that the government be prohibited from using an explicit race-
based factor to advance Grutter's race-based intellectual diversity
scheme.
Professor Flagg's statement that her discourse on academic
diversity is not a discourse on race-based affirmative action is
unpersuasive. Race is a significant factor in her discourse on
90 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 328-33 (2003) (discussing substantial benefits
to intellectual diversity in educational forums).
91 Flagg, supra note 75, at 830.
92 See Id. at 831 (commenting that issue of "costs to whites" is partially to blame for
decreasing push for affirmative action among whites).
93 See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 354 (1949) (suggesting that race may be one of those traits "which can
never be made the basis of a constitutional classification").
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both affirmative action and academic diversity. 94 The argument
theorizes that race-conscious academic diversity does not impose
cost on innocent whites because the beneficiaries are equally
whites and people of color. 95 The no-cost argument to innocent
whites should be rejected because if a race-based intellectual
diversity admissions policy rejects a white applicant with
identical credentials to an admitted African-American, it is
incorrect to say that both applicants with identical credentials
benefited equally under the intellectual diversity concept if race
was considered as a positive plus factor for the African-American
candidate only.
Although Professor Flagg may be correct in contending that
intellectual diversity does not characterize people of color as
undeserving, 96 it is very difficult for African-Americans to be
received as equals in a diverse intellectual community because
they will be presumed to have entered the intellectual
community in spite of their presumed less-than-elite academic
credentials and standardized test scores. Although academic
diversity may value the experiences and values that intellectual
diversity bring to the academic community, most professors do
not expect intellectual diversity students to perform on the law
school final examinations and legal research papers as well as
their non-diversity counterparts. While it is true that academic
94 Even with that caveat, the discourse of diversity is not a discourse of affirmative
action. It does not understand the use of race conscious policies to impose costs on
"innocent whites" because its beneficiaries are equally whites and persons of color. It
does not characterize people of color as "undeserving," but values the experiences and
perspectives they bring to the academic community equally with those of whites.
Academic diversity cherishes difference, and so harbors few qualms about taking into
account any personal characteristic, including race, that might be salient with respect
to intellectual heterogeneity. Unlike constitutional doctrine, which strongly
disapproves 'government's use of race-conscious measures, the quest for academic
diversity questions whether it is possible to consider the whole person for admission
purposes without considering race. Finally, diversity discourse is not concerned with
remedial objectives; diversity is desirable in and of itself, and in the present (citing
Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F.
L. REV. 757, 766 (1997)).
See Flagg, supra note 75, at 836.
95 See Id. at 828-37 (noting that University of Michigan Law School community
benefits from unique "perceptions" and "experiences" of historically underrepresented
students).
96 See Id. at 828 (commenting that in admissions diversity discourse, "applicants'
backgrounds and experiences" are considered items of merit and students with these
attributes are just as deserving of admission as those students with high grades).
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institutions respect differences, 97 intellectual heterogeneity is a
distant second or third cousin to outstanding academic
performance demonstrated through excellent grades and other
demonstration of superior professional skills. The Grutter
opinion clearly demonstrates that elite law schools are unwilling
to significantly modify their requirements for excellent grades
and high standardized test scores to more effectively
accommodate their alleged compelling state interest in
intellectual heterogeneity. It is my hope that elite law schools
will consider granting a multicultural race-neutral diversity
preference admission to qualified former athletes who have less
than excellent grades and lower standardized test scores. In line
with the view of Justice Thomas that there are many existing
exceptions to the strict consideration of grades and test scores in
the college admission process, the proposal to create an exception
to the strict academic merit system for qualified former athletes
seeking admission to law school is unreasonable. 98
The answer to Professor Flagg's question of whether "it is
possible to consider the whole person for admission purposes
without considering race" 99 is "yes" because race is not relevant
to either academic ability or academic performance. In fact, one
does not have to evaluate the whole person to decide whether or
not he or she is competitive at an elite school. A fair assessment
can be made without using race as a factor to determine whether
an applicant is likely to be competitive at law school based on
their undergraduate grades, standardized test scores, work ethic,
and moral character. I believe an intellectual diversity program
which considers race as a factor is by definition a de facto
remedial policy. It is the history of the racially or socially
disadvantaged that gave rise to the permissible inference that
those who are racially disadvantaged may bring a different
intellectual point of view to a historically homogenous elite white
college (HHEWC). One commentator correctly suggested that
the Grutter Court's diversity rationale "shows how transparently
97 See Id. at 833-36 (explaining that diversity of student experiences is desirable
social goal in academic institutions).
98 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 354 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
99 Flagg, supra note 75, at 837.
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the diversity interest can substitute for one based on remedying
the effects of societal discrimination."l00
Unlike Professor Flagg's contentions to the contrary,
intellectual diversity is desirable only when it is race-neutral.101
Professor Flagg states, "[A] policy that purports to take account
of individuality without reference to color would be insulting to
many persons of color. Thus diversity's interest in and respect
for individuals is undercut by the Court's requirement that an
institution seek out 'workable race-neutral alternatives."' 102
However, an intellectual diversity policy that allows group racial
status to be considered as a relevant factor for college admissions'
race-neutral qualifications that value a person's life experience
on the merit invites the Court to misuse its strict scrutiny
analysis in race-related cases in a manner not unlike that
employed in its holding in Korematsu v. United States. 103
In Korematsu, the Court approved the detention and relocation
of Japanese-Americans because ,it believed that Japanese-
Americans could not be trusted to be loyal to America in its war
with Japan.104 Recent history has taught that the strict scrutiny
analysis did not overcome racial stereotypes about the presumed
views that Japanese-Americans held about the war with
Japan.105 I am concerned that in future cases the Court may
approve race-based harms against students because of
stereotypical perceptions that a racial group's status creates a
compelling inference about one's intellectual view regarding
100 Goowin Liu, Brown @ Fifty Symposium Brown, Bollinger, And Beyond, 47 How.
L.J. 705, 760 (2004). "Although the issue was not presented in Grutter, it is notable that
the Court opinion in reviewing the state of affirmative action never mentioned Croson's
holding that racial preferences may not be used to remedy societal discrimination." Id.
101 Contra Flagg, supra note 75 at 846 (noting race-neutral admissions policies will
impede schools' abilities to identify students with relevant life experiences that are
needed to foster diversity in academic settings).
102 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 339.
103 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944) (noting that legal restrictions, imposed on citizens of one
race, must be subjected to strictest level of scrutiny but because of public necessity are not
always unconstitutional).
104 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that in curbing
rights of Japanese-Americans, federal government was committing act of rank racism).
105 See Id. at 235-36 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting irrationality of and lack
of logical connections or factual support for military's beliefs and assumptions about
Japanese community).
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America's enemies and friends in the international
community. 106
After reviewing Plessy and Korematsu, it is hard to accept that
so many are willing to trust an inherently political democratic
government with the power to use race as a potential plus factor
in deciding the intrinsic value of a single intellectual view in the
academic community. Although race matters to some, race
should not matter in an elite university searching for intellectual
ideas designed to teach others how to use scholarship to serve the
human race by making the world a better and safer place to live.
A college admission policy that pretends to evaluate the whole
person in the admission process but allows race to be a positive
plus factor0 7 for some but not others in the name of intellectual
diversity insults the race-neutral goal of BrowniO8 and hinders
America's goal to be free of its racist past in the field of education
at all levels. It is conceded under Grutter's diversity rationale a
public law school may look at race-neutral SES factors for both
African-Americans and whites as a positive plus factor in the
admission process. However, when race may be used only as a
positive plus factor for selected racial minorities, the Grutter
principle rejects the race-neutral model of Brown in favor of the
unacceptable approach taken in Korematsu of allowing the
intentional use of race against individuals because of their group
racial status to survive the strict scrutiny test.i09
III. IMPLICATIONS OF RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEVIOUS
HISTORY
The Chappell article states that Terry H. Anderson's book,
"The Pursuit of Fairness: A History of Affirmative Action," alleges
that President Richard M. Nixon breathed life into race-based
affirmative action for the expressed evil purpose of dividing
106 See Id. at 237 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating reasons federal government used
to exclude Japanese Americans during World War II, claiming that "[tihey are claimed to
be given to 'emperor worshipping ceremonies' and to 'dual citizenship"').
107 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 333 (acknowledging that, however limited,
universities have authority to make racial distinctions).
108 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that
segregating African-American children to facilities that are physically equal still deprives
those children of "equal educational opportunities").
109 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214.
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blacks and whites along racial and political lines.i"0 According to
Anderson, the federal government made its pledge to support
race-based affirmative action during the first term of the Nixon
administration for political reasons.111 "Racial hiring preferences
had been declared illegal after President Lyndon B. Johnson's
brief experiment with them."112 After the Johnson experiment,
President Nixon reinvigorated race-based affirmative action for
his own political advantage.113 "Democratic liberals would be
forced to defend and expand Nixon's affirmative action policy.
Black hiring preferences would supersede white workers" hard
won seniority rights, thus driving a wedge between union
members and black voters."114 Nixon managed to take advantage
of this racial division in the last part of his first term by
denouncing race-based affirmative action plans and court-
ordered busing.115 "As Nixon hoped, white rank-and-filers
abandoned the Democrats in droves."116
President Nixon initially used affirmative action to give the
superficial appearance that he was accommodating the African-
American interest in achieving economic equality in the
workplace.117 He manipulated race-based affirmative action for
the express purpose of persuading many middle class whites to
abandon the Democratic Party. At the time, many whites viewed
racial preferences granting economic equality to African-
Americans in the workplace as a direct threat to a white worker's
interest in job security."l8 Whenever scholars of color evaluate
race-based affirmative action or race-neutral affirmative action
as a method for remedying inequality in our society we must be
110 See Chappell, supra note 34 (noting that Nixon's actions were "partly from
political calculations").
111 See Id. (explaining that federal government support of affirmative action did not
come until Nixon's presidency and that these actions helped Nixon politically during his
first term).
112 Id.
113 See Id. (stating that Nixon politically "revived" preferences).
114 Id.
115 See id. (calling busing a "strong remedy").
116 Id.
117 See Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-
Century Race Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1923, 1995 (2000) (noting that affirmative action
programs resulted in minorities receiving positions where they would "previously be
excluded").
118 See Chappell, supra note 34, at B7 (describing how Nixon gained votes from
middle-class white Democrats by taking advantage of diverting interests of union
members and black voters).
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mindful to apply Professor Derrick Bell's interest convergence
theory."l 9 According to this theory, "the interest of Blacks in
achieving racial equality will only be accommodated when it
converges with the interests of whites."120
More than thirty years after President Nixon endorsed
race-based affirmative action for political reasons, 121 we come to
this critical question: Is the interest of most African-Americans
in achieving educational equality and economic justice actually
being accommodated under the Supreme Court's Grutter holding,
allowing the use of race as a factor in deciding law school
admissions under a properly structured diversity program?122
Critical race scholars of color, and all other scholars, must
analyze the issue of whether race-based affirmative action is
designed to divide the African-American community between
affluent educated blacks eager to attend historically elite white
universities and poor uneducated blacks who are often trapped in
a vicious cycle of poverty and violence.123 The Chappell article
states that an effective race-based affirmative action plan has a
propensity to give assistance to well off African-American
students with college-educated parents.124 Chappell concludes
that race-based affirmative action provides only a slight
opportunity for poor blacks that are the greatest victims of
racism. 125
Legal scholars of color have a special obligation to determine
whether Grutter's rationale for diversity leaves behind most
119 See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education And The Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1983) (claiming that Supreme Court found a
convergence of interests of blacks and whites in Brown v. Board of Education, as opposed
to selecting rights of one group over other).
120 Id. at 523.
121 See Chappell, supra note 34, at B7 (pointing out that although racial hiring
preferences were illegal under Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, Nixon was in favor of
them in order to sway votes of Democratic liberals who would support policy).
122 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 331-33 (acknowledging importance of education
and propriety of university's interest in diverse student body).
123 See Chappell, supra note 34, at B7. Chappell recognized that often affirmative
action assists more affluent blacks rather than those suffering from the most poverty and
racism. Id. A persuasive argument can be made that race-based affirmative action college
admission policies actually favors affluent blacks who especially share traditional middle
class values about education.
124 See Chappell, supra note 34, at B7 (stating specifically that those receiving
benefits of affirmative action are often children of college-educated parents who have
already been accepted to college).
125 See Id. (concluding that because affluent blacks obtain most help from affirmative
action, poorest blacks often miss out as a result).
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rank-and-file African-Americans, while creating a small group of
African-American intellectuals who accommodate and emulate
the superior economic status of the white upper class. 126 Legal
scholars of color must constantly address issues of discrimination
and equality from Brown to Grutter from Professor's Derrick
Bell's interest convergence perspective.127
Such scholars should also not neglect Professor Bell's thought-
provoking warning that "all judicial activity in racial cases before
and after Brown"128 analyzing the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause "will not authorize a judicial remedy
providing effective racial equality for Blacks where the remedy
sought threatens the superior societal status of middle and upper
class whites."129 African-Americans must be careful not to allow
race-based affirmative action to be used by the judicial review
process as a devious interest divergence theory to take away from
the battle for true economic justice on race-neutral terms.
IV. RACE-NEUTRAL DIVERSITY PLANS MAY BE REFINED AND DEFENDED
AS EFFECTIVE METHODS OF ACCOMMODATING CLASS BASED DIVERSITY
The Texas Legislature, in adopting the Top Ten Percent plan to
achieve diversity, may well have concluded that it had
established a comprehensive race-neutral diversity plan that is
superior to race-based affirmative action in expanding both
intellectual diversity, geographical diversity, and socio-economic
status diversity.130 Sponsors of the Top Ten Percent Plan could
have explained the plan as expanding diversity using a cross-
section of students based on academic performance in high school
without having an adverse impact on racial minorities.13 1 In
fairness to the Texas Legislature, it did not have the benefit of
the expanded interpretation of diversity the Supreme Court
126 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (forbidding quotas, but allowing institutions to
consider race "plus" in addition to other qualifications).
127 See Bell, supra note 119, at 518 (suggesting that concentrating on enhancing
quality of education overall is more important than focusing on issue of segregation).
128 Id. at 523.
129 Id.
130 See Jonathan D. Glater, Diversity Plan Shaped in Texas Is Under Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2004, at 1 (discussing results and controversies of Texas legislature's
alternative to race-based affirmative action) [hereinafter Glater].
131 See Id. (explaining purpose of Texas legislation as removing race from admissions
policies of state universities and substituting it with merit-based system).
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approved in Grutter.132 Following a federal court decision
prohibiting the use of race in the admissions process at the public
universities and colleges in Texas,133 the Legislature responded
by enacting a law assuring entrance to the public college or
university of choice to those graduating in the top ten percent of
their class from any private or public high school in Texas.134
A Texas law designed to satisfy the federal court's race-neutral
college admissions requirements had the practical effect of
expanding diversity for Texas colleges and universities while
restoring racial diversity on a race-neutral basis.135 The Texas
Top Ten Percent Plan has been a successful approach for
achieving race-neutral diversity.136 California and Florida have
adopted race-neutral diversity plans comparable to the one
adopted in Texas with some modifications.137 In view of the
Court's holding in Gutter allowing the express use of race as a
factor in the admission process, I do not think a claim that the
race-neutral percentage plan is unconstitutional pretext for race
discrimination is likely to succeed. The Top Ten Percent law has
been particularly successful in avoiding allegations of intentional
discrimination based on race in the college admissions process,
but has recently been disparaged in Texas because of perceived
132 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 342 (stating "Universities in California, Florida,
and Washington State, where racial preferences in admissions are prohibited by state
law, are currently engaged in experimenting with a wide variety of alternative
approaches. Universities in other States can and should draw on the most promising
aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they develop."). Cf. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Mhe States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far
from clear.").
133 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
134 See Glater, supra note 130, at 1 (citing specifics of Texas law).
135 In many ways, the 10 percent rule has transformed the student population on
the campus here. For one thing, the number of schools that send their graduates to
the University of Texas has risen by a third, from just over 600 to more than 800.
And, according to the admissions office, the new freshman class will be, for the first
time, more diverse than classes were before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit struck down affirmative action in higher education in 1996. Of the
6,341 students who have sent in deposits so far, the university classifies 3,536 as
Anglo, 298 as African-American, 1,146 as Hispanic and 1,128 as Asian. (In addition,
23 are classified as Native American and 210 as "other.") [sic].
See Id.
136 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 342 (concluding that race-based admissions
policies offend equal protection and should be limited in time).
137 See Glater, supra note 130, at 1 (noting other states, such as California and
Florida, adopted legislation similar to that of Texas').
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reverse class-based discrimination.138 Under the reverse class
discrimination attack, wealthy parents find the most fault with
the plan because they believe their children are not treated fairly
under its rules. 139
The criticism leveled at the Top Ten Percent Plan by wealthy
parents is simply invalid. In fact, the Texas law should not be
changed to accommodate the allegation of reverse discrimination
by affluent parents who are disappointed that their children did
not finish in the top ten percent of their class. Parents of
children denied a perceived right of entry to the University of
Texas at Austin contend that a number of high schools are
superior to others, and. that staying in the top 25 percent at a
superior school should be given greater weight than placing in
the top ten percent of an inferior school.140 The heated discussion
surrounding the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan reveals that socio-
economic status, rather than race, is the real proxy for doling out
precious but scarce spots in elite universities. The Glater article
demonstrates that Professor Bell's interest convergence theory141
should be expanded to apply to socio-economic status issues of
inequality and class142 discrimination in the American struggle
for diversity at its elite colleges and universities. 143
138 See Id. (stating "[any change in the rule raises the touchy subject of class,
because those demanding change tend to be concerned about students at the state's elite
high schools in wealthy areas, while defenders of the rule say they are worried about
students from poorer rural and urban neighborhoods.").
139 See Id. (describing wealthy parents' problems with Texas law).
140 critics of the rule say that students from poor high schools without the
resources of wealthier institutions. are not ready for the work at an elite public
university, and that too many graduates of high-powered high schools are leaving the
state for college when they do not get into the University of Texas. 'Those kids are
not prepared," said Douglas S. Craig, a lawyer in Houston whose son, Charles, was
not accepted at the university. Charles Craig went to the University of Colorado at
Boulder instead, Mr. Craig said, adding that getting into the top 10 percent at his
son's selective private high school was very difficult. "His class was two-thirds
National Merit scholars and semifinalists. Their scores are all very, very high." But
Bruce Walker, vice provost and director of admissions at the University of Texas, said
data collected by the university showed that students admitted under the 10 percent
rule consistently get better grades than other students. Critics question that data,
however, and argue that SAT scores are a better measure of students' abilities. The
SAT scores of students in the top 10 percent there have fallen slightly over the last
several years, according to the admissions office.
See Glater, supra note 130, at 1.
141 See Bell, supra note 119, at 523 (stating that principle of interest convergence
provides that interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only
when it converges with interests of whites).
142 "It"s a big-time social class story," said Marta Tienda, a Princeton University
professor of sociology and public affairs who has studied the effects of the rule.
"School type is the proxy for social class." Guidance counselors and administrators at
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Support of race-neutral diversity plans for the admissions
process results in an overall disagreement with the assertion by
Professor Rosen that "selective universities can't achieve
colorblindness, diversity, and high admission standards at the
same time."144 Professor Rosen and historical opponents of race-
based affirmative action endorsed race-based affirmative action
as a lesser evil than colorblind admissions at elite universities to
limit the number of multicultural and diverse students they
admit.145 It appears that Professor Rosen fears that abandoning
racial preferences would force states to expand diversity in
college admission with percentage plans like the Top Ten Percent
plan in Texas. 146 Professor Rosen suggests that expanding
diversity beyond narrow racial preferences "would be the end of
America's great universities."147  Professor Rosen equates
creating diversity beyond just race in a multicultural society with
plans such as the Texas Top Ten Percent plan with lowering the
academic standards of an elite college.148
rural schools question the motives behind changing the rule. "The State of Texas has
done a great thing by offering this opportunity to get our most gifted students into a
challenging educational setting," said Cherri S. Franklin, principal of the public
junior and senior high school in Marfa. "And the rich people don't want them there.
She emphasized that she was speaking for herself and not the school system."
See Glater, supra note 130, at 1.
143 "Opinions about the 10 percent rule do not fall neatly into predictable
categories. While affirmative action-historically used only at the 'state's two flagship
schools, the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M University-drew harsh
attacks from political conservatives, the 10 percent rule has critics and supporters
from different places on the ideological spectrum. Todd Staples, a Texas state senator
who has questioned the 10 percent rule, said he was not sure what kind of change
would be appropriate. ""My senatorial district is sprawling across a part of 16
counties, from rural to suburban fast growth"," Mr. Staples, a Republican, said. ""So I
have a mixture of high schools that are impacted differently on this issue. My goal is
to have a win-win policy." State Senator Royce West, a Democrat from Dallas,
predicted that reaching consensus on changes to the 10 percent rule would be
difficult. Senator West, who heads the committee that will hold the hearing on the
rule, conducted an end-of-session filibuster to block a cap on it. ""I am not going to
stand here and let this rule be abolished when it has not served its purpose yet"," he
said. He said any changes would have to coitinue some form of preference for
students at schools that have historically been underrepresented.
Id.
144 See Jeffrey Rosen, How I Learned to Love Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2003, at 52
(stating that universities can only achieve two out of three of these goals).
145 See Id. (stating that he converted from an affirmative action skeptic to supporter
because its abolishment would result in lowering of rigorous academic standards).
146 See Id. (arguing that ten percent plan was adopted as way to lower academic
standards and that it was the direct result of 5th Circuit's ban on affirmative action).
147 See Id. (quoting 1997 Supreme Court brief filed by three University of Texas law
professors).
148 I wish I could say there were a single, dramatic moment of revelation that
turned me from an affirmative action skeptic into a supporter. But the truth is that
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It is a fair assessment of the Grutter opinion to conclude that
the Supreme Court allowed a public university to take advantage
of race as a flexible aspect of other factors to be utilized in
making an admissions decision at an elite state university law
school.149 The Court's decision in Grutter to permit the use of
race in the college admission process undermines the important
role that race-neutral Texas Top Ten Plan is now playing in
promoting socio-economic status diversity.150  However, the
my conversion took place over several years, in the late 1990's. After the courts and
popular initiatives began to ban affirmative action, I noticed that state legislatures
and universities rebelled, deciding' on their own that racial diversity is more
important than meritocracy. In bothCalifornia and Texas, the political pressures to
achieve racial diversity proved so overwhelming that when each state's universities
were forbidden to take race into account in the admissions process, they simply
refused to accept the decline in black and Hispanic enrollment that inevitably
followed. Instead, universities responded to the widespread political demand for
diversity by devising plans that, in effect, lowered academic standards across the
board. This response has had some success in keeping up minority enrollments, but
at the cost of an even more serious compromise of academic standards than the
relatively modest concession represented by affirmative action itself. In other words, I
became convinced that selective universities can't achieve colorblindness, diversity
and high admission standards at the same time. They can achieve only two out of the
three goals. For the most part, schools would prefer to choose standards and
diversity, using racial preferences to create a diverse class while keeping standards
relatively high. But if the courts order colorblindness, America's finest public and
private universities won't hesitate for a moment in choosing diversity as the second
goal, allowing rigorous admissions standards to go out the window. This is a prospect
that both the Bush administration and some of the conservative justices on the
Supreme Court seem ready to embrace. "If Michigan really cares enough about that
racial imbalance, why doesn"t it ... lower the standards, not have a flagship elite law
school?" asked Justice Antonin Scalia at the oral argument. "It solves the problem."
Id.
149 See Kerstin Forsythe, Racial Preference and Affirmative Action in Law School
Admissions: Reactions from Minnesota Law Schools and Ramifications for Higher
Education in the Wake of Grutter v. Bollinger, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 155, 165
(2003) (citing James E. Coleman Jr., An Ode to Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.: The Supreme
Court Approves the Consideration of Race as a Factor in Admissions by Public Institutions
of Higher Education, Duke Law, available at http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/supreme
courtonline/commentary/gravbol.html) (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
150 In Texas, the percentage plan Bush signed into law in 1997 as governor can be
summed up in a sentence: The top 10% of graduating seniors from every high school
in the state are guaranteed admission to any Texas public university. The California
and Florida plans admit the top 4% land 20%, respectively. But unlike Texas, neither
guarantees admission to its flagship institutions. Conceived by black and Hispanic
state legislators, the Texas law doesn't specifically consider race; rather, it aims to
capture the best students in -each of the state's high schools, regardless of race or
economic standing. The idea is to reward the hardest- working and brightest
students statewide, regardless of the quality of education they receive. But in doing
so, it takes advantage of the state's racial diversity-and segregation. And, it
removes the hurdle of standardized tests, on which Hispanic and black students have
historically posted lower scores than average. UT junior Vanessa Medina, for
example, got 'A's in high school, was president of the speech and debate team,
completed advanced- placement English and other college-prep courses, and ranked
sixth out of more than 200 students -in her 2000 graduating class at Riverside High
School in El Paso. But with "only a handful of kids" aspiring to college, Medina says
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cherished principle of equal protection could have been honored,
and diversity expanded, if the court had held that diversity is a
public necessity in America, and that the Texas Top Ten Percent
Plan demonstrates that diversity can be achieved on elite college
campuses without race-based affirmative action.151 It remains to
be seem whether some version of race-neutral percent plan will
work at the law school level. I am discussing the race-neutral
percent plans in college admission for the express purpose of
generating dialogue about race-neutral alternatives in advancing
SES diversity. I believe the Texas percent plans have the
incidental effect of benefiting racial minorities and others on
equal terms in the college admission process. While I do not
suggest that the diversity percent plans are a cure-all and will
work with equal success for every situation, it is my belief that
race-neutral diversity percentage plans are a lesser public evil in
the college admission process than race-based plans.
The Court's race-based rationale in Grutter changes the strict
scrutiny test from strict in theory and fatal in fact, to strict in
theory but flexible in fact. 152 The problem with a flexible in fact
test for racial discrimination is that the flexible approach
virtually assures that the equal protection of the law prohibiting
racial discrimination can easily be adjusted to accommodate a
new and unimproved notion of a race-based "connected but
she often wasn't challenged in high school. "A lot of teachers conformed to the
students. They didn't expect very much," she says. Now a psychology major, Medina,
admitted through the top 10% law, is maintaining a 3.5 grade-point average and has
set her sights on graduate school.
See Mary Beth Marklein, Affirmative Action Faces Another Test, USA TODAY, Mar. 26,
2003 at 7D (describing the percentage plan as used in Texas public universities).
151 And UT data show that students enrolled under the 10% law, including
minorities, have consistently outperformed other students with comparable test
scores, though the grade-point averages of black and Hispanic students admitted in
the top 10% were lower than those of white and Asian students in that group. Some
surprises have emerged, too. For example, more women are enrolling in math and
science, fields that have struggled to recruit women and minorities. And "they're
kicking 'men's butts," admissions director Bruce Walker says. But even modest gains
'didn't come easily. Just after the percentage plans became law, white and Asian-
American enrollments rose while the numbers dropped for blacks and Hispanics.
That prompted university officials to get aggressive, increasing recruitment and
scholarships at high schools where Hispanic and black students were a majority.
Id. (explaining the achievements of the percentage program in Texas public universities,
in terms of academic performance and diversity).
152 See Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. at 326-27 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena 515 U.S. 200, 257 (1995), finding that government use of race-based criteria is not
inherently invalid as long as it is narrowly tailored, and that "strict scrutiny is not "strict
in theory, but fatal in fact").
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unequal" diversity theory in the field of higher education. The
Supreme Court used an acknowledged strict in theory, flexible in
fact approach in Korematsu to visit a racial wrong on Japanese-
Americans because of their racial group status. The Top Ten
Percent Plan properly advances the state's goal of creating a
diverse learning experience on its college campuses without
exhibiting race as a factor, and without invoking the strict
scrutiny test for race-based classifications. Strong proponents of
the percentage plans have at times been found guilty of
"overselling it."153 I do not intend to sell "percentage plans as any
kind of panacea,"154 but after a careful reading of the Plessy,
Korematsu, and Grutter opinions, it is easy to oppose the burdens
being inflicted based on racial group when a controversial, but
effective, race-neutral percentage plan or other alternative may
be available.
The Grutter majority's assertion that the University of
Michigan implemented workable alternatives before considering
race in its admission process is not consistent with the findings of
the federal district court. 155 There is virtually nothing in the
Grutter opinion to suggest that the University of Michigan had
actually implemented in good faith a race-neutral plan that
failed to generate the desired intellectual diversity. The Grutter
Court gave the United States' argument suggesting that race-
neutral percentage plans were effective methods for expanding
intellectual diversity only minor consideration. 156 Under an
153 See Marklein, supra note 150 (stating "[s]till, like many proponents of the
percentage plan, Torres says Bush is overselling it. "I would be very skeptical of
percentage plans as any kind of panacea,'').
154 Id.
155 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 340 (holding that "the Law School sufficiently
considered workable race-neutral alternatives," and noting the District Court took Law
School to task for failing to consider race-neutral alternatives such as "using a lottery
system" or "decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and LSAT
scores, stating also these alternatives would require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the
academic quality of all admitted students, or both.").
156 The United States advocates "percentage plans," recently adopted by public
undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida, and California to guarantee admission
to all students above a certain class-rank threshold in every high school in the State.
The United States does not, however, explain how such plans could work for graduate
and professional schools. More-over, even assuming such plans are race-neutral, they
may preclude the university from conducting the individualized assessments
necessary to assemble a student body that is not just racially diverse, but diverse
along all the qualities valued by the university. We are satisfied that the Law School
adequately considered race-neutral alternatives currently capable of producing a
critical mass without forcing the Law School to abandon the academic selectivity that
is the cornerstone of its educational mission.
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appropriate race-neutral plan, a university or college is not
required to conduct an evaluation of the whole person to decide
whether she will bring intellectual diversity. Elite public
universities recruit student athletes with minimum academic
qualifications free of race factors on a routine basis mwithout
considering the whole person. It is only when race is to be
considered as a factor in the admission process is a law school
constitutionally required under Grutter to consider enough other
factors to establish that race was not the predominant factor.157
The law school in Grutter correctly concluded that all of the
student admitted under its race-based diversity program were
qualified to study law at Michigan but based on the traditional
qualifications of grades and LSAT scores, it created the inference
the diversity applicants may not be the best qualified. It is my
contention that law schools like those colleges recruiting athletes
have the race-neutral ability to admit qualified individuals based
on unique talents and experiences free of considering race. In
recruit athletes, the predominant factor in recruiting qualified
but academically inferior athletes is athletic ability. At the law
school level, it may be appropriate to admit qualified individuals
with academically inferior credentials by considering the
candidate's cross cultural ability to expand a multiracial
understanding among people from a variety of SES backgrounds
free of racial discrimination. When it comes to creating race-
neutral diversity in law school admissions, one must be prepared
to think outside of the race card box.
Professor Torres' excellent explanation about the positive ways
that the Texas Top Ten Percent plan has expanded the
educational opportunities for nontraditional students at the
University of Texas was published in the Columbia Law Review
four months after the Grutter decision in June of 2004.158 I am
Id. (discussing the position of the United States based upon an amicus curiae brief).
157 Id. at 336-37 (requiring admissions programs to remain "flexible enough to ensure
that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an
applicants race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application," holding
"individualized, holistic review" without focus on any particular soft variable was
acceptable for race-conscious admissions program).
158 Gerald Torres, Symposium: On Grutter and Gratz: Examining "Diversity" in
Education: Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger: View From a Limestone Edge, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1596, 1602 (2003) (explaining that University of Texas' use of Top Ten
Percent plan has resulted in student body with higher numbers of minority students than
race-conscious program that was used before it).
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now convinced that Professor Torres' analysis of the Texas
percent plan make those plans strong candidates for advancing
diversity on a race-neutral basis at the undergraduate college
level.159 Regardless of how one feels about race-based affirmative
actiono or race-neutral alternatives, my commitment to the
concept of economic justice in our society leads me to the
conclusion that the Michigan Law School did not make a
compelling case that there were no effective race-neutral
alternatives to achieve diversity. The insights shared by
Professor Torres' evaluation of the real impact that the Texas
Top Percent Plan has on the lives of disadvantaged SES students
leads me to the conclusion that society must work harder by
thinking outside the race box to expand diversity with top
graduates with a predominant disadvantaged SES history while
deleting race as a factor in its admission criteria. 160
Although the Texas Top Percent Plan has had his greatest
impact at the undergraduate level,161 there is no evidence that a
159 See Id. at 1604 (suggesting that percentage plan adopted by university resulted in
socio-economic and geographic diversity that was comparable to race-conscious program).
160 Affirmative action brought us students of color, but we were not expanding our
feeder school base or our representation of socioeconomic groups. Moreover, we were
missing some of the most qualified, neediest students of color and those who would be
most likely to succeed and to return after their freshman year. Therefore, finally,
Hopwood forced us to build a student body that was truly more diverse-not just
more racially and ethnically representative, but also more geographically and
socioeconomically representative of the state. Sadly, I think we would not have rolled
up our sleeves and made the effort of doing the math and trudging into the neglected
high schools and neglected districts had it not been for Hopwood. The truth is that it
is not a criticism of percent plans to say they must be properly and aggressively
implemented in order to work. In fact, that is the point. There is no magic bullet for
the problems of educational inequality. What affirmative action and percent plans
both reveal is that there is a large and unpaid debt owed to the K-12 systems and
that there is a need for universities to reexamine their goals and codify them into
admission, retention, recruitment, and financial aid policies. The relationship of elite
institutions of higher education to K-12 has begun to be transformed by the shock
treatment that Hopwood represented.
See Id. at 1608.
161 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals forced the University to think about how it
would assemble a diverse pool of potential students. Critics of the Top 10% Plan often
lump it with the California and Florida plans and frequently mischaracterize it as an
assault on affirmative action. That may be true in California and Florida, but in
Texas the legislation was created by African American and Latino legislators who
were historically the principal advocates of racial, ethnic, economic, and geographic
diversity. They were joined by farseeing rural white conservatives who saw in the Top
10% Plan a chance to enroll a robustly diverse class at the flagship universities of the
University of Texas and Texas A & M. The University of Texas has been aggressive in
implementing the plan. The University of Texas has proven that an institution in a
state like Texas can, in its undergraduate program, build a diverse class on the basis
of the Top 10% Plan. The plan has also forced the admissions administrators to
recognize that the University's traditional admission schemes were causing it to miss
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modified version of the percent concept will not be effective at the
graduate or professional level. The Texas Top Ten Percent Plan
is designed to reward the hard work and academic success of
students who attended high schools that were not traditional
feeder schools for the prestigious University of Texas.162 For
example, the University of Michigan would not be sacrificing its
academic quality by guaranteeing admission to the valedictorians
of thirty previously identified colleges with a disproportionate
number of students from a personal disadvantaged SES
background who have a demonstrated potential for increasing
intellectual diversity. There is a strong likelihood that the top
academic graduate from a college with a disproportionate
number of its students from a disadvantaged SES would add
both geographical and intellectual diversity to an elite law school.
In practice, the Michigan Law School could decide to offer
preference diversity admission to individuals for a host of SES
reasons that exclude race. I simply refuse to believe that elite
law schools cannot maintain academic quality while increasing
the intellectual diversity on campus with nontraditional students
who are the top academic performers from their respective
colleges.163 A university or college willing to engage in hard work
students with the academic potential to prosper at the university level. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the Top 10% Plan has allowed the University to broaden
its service to the state of Texas by drawing its freshman class from more high schools
and school districts than ever before. As a result, the University is 'doing a better job
of what a flagship state university is supposed to do for the communities of the state.'
Id. at 1601-02.
162 Id. at 1603 (noting that "because of the composition of Texas communities, this
recruiting and financial aid mechanism reached a significant number of nonwhite
students").
163 Despite the misgivings about relying on a single factor, admissions officials are
convinced that, from the standpoint of admissions as a science, there is a place for
automatic admissions policies based on GPAs. Research on the students admitted
under HB 588 reveals what many educators already know but what those who are
committed to standardized testing are loathe to admit: High school performance is a
better indicator of college performance than are standardized test scores. Top-ten
percenters make much higher grades in college than non-top-ten percenters; in fact,
these students (who in many cases would not have been admitted any other way
because of their lower entrance exam scores) are now performing as well in college as
their non-top-ten-percent counterparts who scored 200-300 points higher on the SAT.
What this has meant for Texas is that, because students of color have historically had
lower standardized test scores than whites, these successful minority students would
not have made it into the University of Texas without the combination of HB 588 and
the efforts of the University to make it work. In addition to evidence of the academic
success of the top-ten percenters, since implementing the law the University has seen
retention rates improve from 87% to 92%. Based on the two most important
indicators of academic success (college grades and return rates), the efforts of the
University of Texas to implement HB 588 have yielded a more qualified entering
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to increase intellectual diversity at the graduate school or
professional level should grant a preference to qualified
individuals using SES factors and refuse to give race any
consideration in its necessary and proper battle for meaningful
diversity.164 My discussion of using race-neutral SES factors to
promote academic diversity at top colleges and law school is
different from the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan but my
discussion of the race-neutral alternative has been inspired by
the success of that plan.165
V. CONCLUSION
Because the conceptual framework for effective race-neutral
educational diversity demonstrated by the success of the Texas
Top Ten Percent Plan could be designed to create true
educational diversity based on socio-economic status, the
Supreme Court should reconsider the race-based diversity
scheme presented in Grutter as soon as possible. The Texas Ten
Percent Plan is in fact and in law a proxy for an America divided
by class in education from preschool to professional school. The
Texas plan is valid and important because it considers the
entirety of the educational experience and its impact on
individual students when addressing issues impacting status
diversity. Because "Texas looks a lot like the neighborhood the
United States is becoming,"166 I am strongly recommending the
Texas Top Ten Percent concept as a model for the expansion of
real diversity in this nation. While Professor Torres' conclusion
that not all of the lessons of Hopwood and the Texas Top Ten
Percent Plan can be generalized to all of America is accurate, 167
it certainly has enough lessons in it for each state, and school, in
the nation to develop effective race-neutral plans. Professor
class of students than conventional admissions programs and conventional
affirmative action policies.
Id. at 1604.
164 Contra Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 340 (noting that even assuming
percentage plans are race-neutral, "they may preclude the university from conducting the
individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not just racially
diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued by the university").
165 Torres, supra note 158, at 1608.
166 Id. at 1609.
167 See Id. (acknowledging that "we know that all of the lessons will not be able to be
generalized beyond Texas").
RACE-NEUTRAL AFFPMA TIVE ACTION
Torres correctly suggests that utilizing versions of the Texas plan
to expand educational diversity into other neighborhoods
requires a great deal of local knowledge.16s However, weaving
considerations of race into the Texas college admission process,
along with the Top Ten Percent Plan, is to do a disservice to the
people of Texas. The Top Ten Percent Plan has effectively
expanded real diversity without any such consideration.169
It is my belief that the Texas high performing scholar's concept
will expand educational diversity at all levels in most
communities across America. I am glad that Professor Torres
has provided us with an excellent critique of the Texas Top Ten
Percent Plan in his very reflective comments as we continue to
confront the implication of status issues for diversity and higher
education.170 These and all reflections on education and diversity
should be studied and considered as vital for all serious scholars
of a subject the entire nation can no longer afford to ignore.
168 See Id. (admitting that there is "a strong dose of local knowledge contained in the
lessons of HB 588 and how it has worked as implemented by the University of Texas").
169 Contra Id. at 1608 (arguing "[b]y weaving considerations of race into our
admissions policies without forgetting the lessons we have learned since 1996, we will be
better able to serve the entire state as well as the students on campus.")
170 Id. at 1596 (noting that the Texas Top Percent plan "had effectively kept the
undergraduate college integrated, but it did not and probably could not be made to apply
in any sensible way to the Law School or to any other graduate or professional schools").
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